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The Effect of tho Defeat of Varus upon
'%he Imperial Policy of Rome Regarding tho northern Frontier .
I. Introduction.
1. Prevalent opinions among historians.
II. Destructive criticism.
1. Small army — not a regular battle, so no real test.
a. Whole army of the Rhine not with Varus in fight.
b. Herely a running fight in the swamps.
2. Subsequent events.
a. Roman armies marched and countermarched over all
Germany with little opposition.
(1) . Tiberius.
(2) . Germanic us.
3. Roman power infinitely greater than -even that of combined
Germany.
a. Authorities agree that Augustus could have conquer
ed Germany had he made a whole hearted attempt.
b. Ten legions might have been assembled here, just
as he had done in Pannonia.
( 4. Contrary to well known character of Augustus.
J a. Man of peace.
V b. Han of determined character.
5. Contrary to rreneral peace policy of Rome.
G. Highly unlike Rome to give up a ~reat national policy on
acount of a single setback.
a. Loll ius_' defea.t unnoticed.
Hew Interpretation: Augustus was making a scries of demonstrations
in force, to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense
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of the frontier by pacifying a vride atrip of the enemy's country.
1 1 1. Conn true t ivo o rgument
.
1. General frontier policy.
a. Boundaries of Empire,
b. Naturally string frontiers necessary for so exten-
sive an Empire.
2. A series of buffer states the strongest kind of a frontier
o. Gaul.
a. Wealth and Importance.
b. :!eed of strong frontier for its protection.
4. Germany.
a. Value as a province.
b. Position.
(1). Difficulties of holding.
5. Germanic wars.
a. Cause and origin.
(1). Caesar. (2). Agrippa. (3). Drusus.
(4) . Tiberius. (5). Domitius. (6). Vinicius.
(7). Varus. (8). Germanicus
.
b. Manner of conducting these wa.rs.
(1) . I.Iercly annual wearing down of opposition -
not formal conquest.
(2) . Winter quarters seldom established in Ger-
many
.
(5) . 'To garrisons left anywhere at anytime.
(4) . Many forts built on Rhine. Only one, if
any, on Elbe.
(5) . If tribes could be made friendly, they
were not conquered.

6. Analogies.
a. Armenia.
b. M<ed ia.
c
.
Arabia.
7. Success of policy.
a. Jasts for 300 years
.
b. Goths and Huns entered the Empire over upper Rhine
and Danube.
IV . Cone 1 u s i ons
1. Augustus 1 policy not to subdue Germany, for
a. Opposed directly to general policy of Empire.
b. Lie thod different from that in countries really
conquered and similar to method used in other place
to obtain buffer states.
c. Varus 1 defeat not a '~reat blow. Could have subc-uec
Germany just as eaoily after this defeat as before.
d. No direct evidence.
(1). Florus is only ancient author to say that
Augustus intended to conquer Germany.
2. Defeat of Varus not a turning point in Germanic history,
and therefore not of such world wide significance as some
claim for it. It was merely an incidental overthrow of
three Roman lerions.
N.B. This thesis was prepared une'er the supervision of
Professor TV .A . Oio! father
.

I. DESTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.
Historians, in speaking of the defeat of Varus and its bear-
ing upon the subsequent history of Germany, are practically unani-
mous in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A ,DW
had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far east as the
River Elbe. Gardthausen^ defines his position clearly in the foll-
owing words 2 : "cr wollte das Land ostlich vom Rhein unci ndrdlich
von der Donau rait seinem Reiche^r vereinigen urn ihm eine bessere
Granze zu geben." Meyer, although he objects to the assertion that
the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality of the Gorman
nation^, nevertheless does think that Augustus intended to conquer
Germany, as shown by these words: "nur gegen die Germanen, hat er
sich nach d^r Vollendung der Organisation Galliens zxaa Kriege ent-
schlossen: derselbe schien notwendig urn Gallien zu sichern und wo-
moglich in der Elblinie eine kurzere und zugleich weiter von Italien
abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen^." Mommsen's words are no less direct
when he says^: "Drusus .... on the return cf Augustus to Italy, took
up the administration of Gaul and chief command against the Germans,
whose subjugation was now contemplated in earnest."
From a consideration of the foregoing opinions, we notice a
strikingly universal belief, that before the battle in the Teuto-
burg forest, Augustus was attempting the conquest of Germany, and
that this battle caused him to give up his plans and relinquish the
hope of making it a province. Most authors claim, in addition, that
1. The material on this subject is enormous and in most instances
just a few of the most representative authorities are cited. Unless
otherwise specified, the following works are referred to for the
several authors: Gerdthausen, Augustus und Seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891ff.
Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire from Caesar to Diocletian,
translated by'V .F .Dickson, New York, 1887, volume I: Meyer, Ecluard,
Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheor ie
,
Halle, 1910, under the topic,
Kaiser Augustus; Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome, translated
by H . J.Chaytor, New York, 1909, volume 5.
2. Gardthausen, p.lCG9. 3. Meyer, p. 444.
4. Meyer, p. 471. 5. Mommsen, p. 30.
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Arminius war. the preserver of the German nationality and that his
victory over Varus was a turning point in the world' r. history*
.
That Gardthausen believes this is proven by these words of his 2 :
"wenn wir daher jetzt
}
also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren,noch von einer
deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache
gibt, so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Verdienst des
Arminius .
"
The vast importance generally attributed to this defeat sur-
prises the reader of history for several reasons. A study of the
battle reveals several significant facts. Varus at that time had
three legions comprising not more than 20,000 troops . The battle
was not a regular contest, but was a running fight* waged, in the
swamps after heavy rains and against a far superior number of troops4.
This encounter, therefore, fought under such rreat disadvantages,
could not possibly have been a real test of the military ability of
the contending parties. In contrast to the strength of Rome, the loss
of three legions was surely not of itself able to reverse the policy
of that great world power, and that too, when it is remembered that
only a few years before (5 A.D.), Tiberius had assembled twelve leg-
ions against Llarbod^. The authorities all note and recognize this
difficulty. Llommsen aptly expresses it in these words^: "Vie have
difficulty in conceiving that the destruction of an army of 20,000
men without further direct military consequences should have given
a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously governed,
universal empire." He explains it however, in this Way. He says"
(1) .Cf. Gardthausen, p. 1203; Llommsen, p. 61; Ferrero, p. 325; and
Meyer, p. .444, for different opinion.
(2) .Gardthausen, n.1202. (3) .Mommsen, p. 61.
(4) .Velleius, 2, 119. (5). Tacitus, Annals, 2,46; At se duo-
dec im legionibus pet i turn duce Tiber io inlibatam Germanorum gloriam
servavisse, mox condicionibus aequis discessum.
(6) . Llommsen, p. 61. (7 ) . ilommsen, p. 62.
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that there is no other reason to be found for it, than that they
(Augustus and Tiberius) recognized the plans pursued by them for
twenty years, for the changing of the boundary to the north, as
incapable of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the
region between the Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend
the resources of the empire. Meyer explains this by saying that it
was not possible to raise sufficient troops for the conquest .
Although it is vory significant that this battle was not
a fair test of their comparative strength, still the consideration
of the incidents following the defeat is no less noteworthy. One
would expect that the ensuing events of such a momentous engagement
would have been equally, if not more important than the battle it-
self. Such, however, is not the case as seen from Mommsen's words
above : "without further direct military consequences." The situation
in Germany after the defeat v/as practically unchanged. If an advan-r
tage v/as had on either side, it was with the Romans, for immediately
the army was increased to eight legions and Tiberius, an experienced
general, was put at its head . Not another victory v/as gained by the
Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius, and later under German icus,
marched and countermarched over practically all of Germany with
scarcely any opposition3 . Velleius tells us of the achievements of
(1) .Meyer, p. 486: "Als in der Varusschlacht drei Legionen vernich-
tet waren, machte es die grosste Kiihe , an ihrer Stelle wenigstens
zwei neiie zu schaffen— man musste zu Zwangsaushebungen unter dem
stsdtischen Proletariat greifen -- wahrend sechig Jahre zuvor Caesar
aus seinem beschrankten Machtbereich die anderthalb Legionen die
Ambiorix vernichtet hatte, mit Leichtigkeit durch drei neue ersetzt
hatte. So erkl&rt es sich dass Gallien trotz aller AufstSnde unter-
worfenist, wahrend fur Germanien der Sieg des Arminius entscheidend
geblieblen let."
(2) . Gardthausen, p. 1223. (3). I'lommsen (p. 53) says that the
defeat was soon compensated, that Tiberius doubtless crossed the
Rhine in 11 A .D . (p. 54), but did. not advance far into the interior,
(p. 56): "Even in the autumn of the year 14, Germanicus in person
led detachmentr of all the legions at Vetera over the Rhine and pen-
etrated ud the Linpe, nretty far into the interior laying waste the

Tiberius after the overthrow of Varus in the following words 1 : " (Tib
erius) mittitur ad Germaniam, Gallias confirraat, disponit exercitus,
praesidia munit et se magnitudine sua. non fiducia host is metiers,
qui Cimbricam Teuton icamque militiara Itpliae mlnabatur, ultro Rhenura
cum rsxercitu transgreditur. Arna infert, quae arcuisse pater et
patria content i erant: penetrat inter ius, aperit limites, vastat a^r
os, urit domos, fund it obvios maximaque cum gloria, incolunni omnium
quos transduxerat , numero in hiberna revert itur." Ve lie ius' leve of
praising Tiberius may have caused him to exaggerate on some of the
details, but we cannot disregard entirely his general statements, as
he was an eye witness. Gardthausen^ says on the authority of Vellei-
us*^ and Suetonius^, that Tiberius, in. the jrear 11 A.B., marched up
the Lippe River, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri,
and that no foe met him in the field. Later on, in 16 A .D . accord-
ing to Mommsen^, Germanicus was so successful'- against the Germans
that he reported to Rone that in the next campaign, he would have
the subjugation of Germany complete^. This means that it was as near
being a province as in any of the preceding years, since it never
7had been completely reduced to tranquillity . Go, as regards poss-
ession, the Romans were in control of just as much, territory as for-
merly, and had the advantage of having an army larger than it had
ever been before.
country far and wide, putting to death the natives and destroying
the temples." Year 15 A.D., he goes farther, up to Ems. Page, 59: "The
second tropaeum of Germanicus spoke of the overthrow of all the Ger-
manic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe." Also Velleius, 2, 120.
(1). Velleius, 2, 120. (2). G?rdthausen, p. 1224.
(3). Velleius, 2, 121. C (4). Suetonius 1 Tiberius, 20.

The presence of this increased armed force demonstrated that
the resources of Rone '"ere by no means exhausted as yet, although it
was more difficult to raise troops than in the time of Julius Caesar
Authorities admit that if Rome had made a whole.; hearted attempt, she
could have conquered Germany just as she had other countries. Meyer
acknowledges this in the following quotation1 : "hatte das Reich, das
die resamte Kulturwelt vom Ocean his zum Euphrat umfasste, von seinen
Machtmitteln ernstlich Gebrauch machen wollen, kein Z /eifel dass die
Germanen ebensogut erlegen waren wie jene." Gardthausen agrees that
Rome could have erased this blot upon her military honor, had she
tried. He says : "auch die Folgen der Catastrophe brauchten nicht
notwendig zu einer so unwiderruflichen Ehtscheidung zu fuhren, denn
die Llachtmittel und die Organisation der beiden streitenden Volker
waren so verschieden, dass Rom bei anderen Verhaltnissen und unter
einem jugendlichen Kaiser, wenn es seine viel reicheren Hulfsquellen
in geeigneter Weise ausgenutzt hatte wohl im Stande gewesen ware,
diesen Flecken seiner militar ischen Ehre wieder auszuloschen.
"
As has been hinted at above, the Romans never had at any time
the full quota of available troops in the field against the Germans.
The largest number of legions assembled, in Germany at any one time
was eight; and this was after the plan of conquering Germany is sup-
posed by many to have been relinquished. On the other hand, when
Tiberius started his great movement against Marbod in the year 6-A.D.
he had twelve legions under his command , and in the following Pan-
nonian revolt, he had ten legions^, exclusive of the five which had
(1). Meyer, p. 486*7. (2). Gardthausen, p. 1201.
(3) . Tacitus' Annals, 2, 46. (Cited above)
(4) . Mommsen, p. 45, note, Is "If we assume that of the twelve legion
who were on the march against I.laroboduus (Tacitus Annals, 2, 46.)^ as
many as we find soon after in Germany, that is, five, went to form
the army there, the Illyrian army of Tiberius numbered seven, and the
number of ten(Velleius
, 2, 113.), may fairly be referred to the con-
tingents from Lloesia and Italy, that of fifteen, to the contingents
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been sent back to Germany. If it had been necessary, Aurustus could
have sent the larger portion of this army of Tiberius into Germany
after the revolt in Pannonia had been quelled. Since, therefore, the
authorities admit that Augustus could have conquered Germany if he
had really tried, and we have seen that he had sufficient troops, had
he cared to use them, then, if he did really change his mind after he
had once resolved to subdue it, a pureljr psychological reason must be
found for this change.
A few obsevations concerning his character ought to bring to
light these reasons, if indeed there are any. Tfas it in accordance
with the character 1 of Augustus for him to give up such a wide sweep-
ing policy because of the intervention of an unfortunate, incidental
defeat? Some try to disparage Augustus 1 character, but there are no
safe grounds for such a belief. Gardthausen concisely remarks "Llit
einem Worte, Augustus ist derselbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug,
sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Iulius Caesar, aber
entschieden verstandiger
.
11 Ke also tells us farther on that Julius
Caesar could begin the impossible^, Augustus never; and that he began
nothing without very careful preparation, trials and tests. Meyer, if
from Egypt or Syria, and to the further levies in Italy, whence the
newly raised legions went no doubt, to Germany, but these thereby
relieved went to the army of Tiberius. Velleius (2, 112) speaks inac-
curately at the very beginning of the war, of five legions brought up
by A. Caecina and Platius Silvanus ex transmarinis provinciis: firstly
the transmarine troops could not be at once on the spot and secondly,
the legions of Caecina were of ceurB© th© Moesian."
(1) . Gardthausen, p. 492.
(2) . Gardthausen, p. 508. Gardthausen also says in this quotation
that Aurustus never hesitated to abandon a plan if he found it too
difficult to carry through. This does not seem to be in accordance
with his other statements that he used such great foresight and so
cannot be accepted as based on logical reasons.
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he does not laud, certainly does not belittle Augustus' character
in these words of his^: "Dor Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist
gewiss unbegrundet . " Considering, then, that Augustus began nothing
without careful and almost elaborate preparation and that he was not
cowardly, what reason is there for believinr that he v;ould so easily
give up such a far-reaching plan?
Even should we admit' that he might easily have given up a
resolution to conquer Germany, it/seems strange that he should even
think Of carrying on so extensive a war after he had become an aged
man, (for he was seventy two years old at this time,) and after his
p
army had been so greatly diminished
.
That Augustus was primarily a man of peace is shown by these
words from his will: " nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato?" Also
the words of Suetonius^: "nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis
causis bellum intulit." A similar belief is advanced by Edward Gib-
bon in the following quotation : but it was reserved for Augustus
to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and
to introduce a spirit of moderation into the public counsels. In-
clined to peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to
discover that Rome in her present exalted situation had much less to
hope than to fear from the chance of arms; and that in the prosecu-
tion of remote wars, the undertaking became every day more difficult,
^ Tttlrou TtpovIoL vTu>Y ol yCey tTTfTfcOOYTfcc, Ko\ 3ov\tuoYTfcs 4 K o A di (T 6 n tra.v TT\\v oAlfyuivrj
U St iv TfeTxy^ev^ CVTDS TO y.\v i^(ruBef)CV fcS T* TOU K<*.l<Ta. p<> S (TT p fcTcf|T £ S »-
(1). Meyer, p. 462. (2). Gardthausen, p. 367, says that
Caesar before Actium had disbanded eight legions of Pompey and parts
of the twentv legions of Lenidus. Cassius Dio, 49, 12: nfS5 v &k rk
T w T iKS'X. V to
TOO
KxTt\bybr^
/ jc h't t,e u \tu (cos, Tc"U 8 eittto'toli & ITpes Tt^.jp
Gardthausen, p. 637, tells of the • reduction of the army after Actiun
"Schon der Reduction des Heeres nach dor Schlacht bei Actium beweist
dies. Sein stehendes Heer sollte nicht grosser sein, als es fur die
Rune des Reiches nach Innen und nach Aussen unbedingt notwendig war,
und fact isch ist er sogar noch unter dieses Minimum lieruntergangen,
wenn er mit ungefahr 200,000 E. die we it gedehnten Grenzen des Reich-
es decken wollte." (3). Llonumentum Ancyranum, p. 104.
(4). Suetonius' A" ' 1 n, 21. (:.). -,- r,- v; ^i'- • on Dec line g.:„;

the event more doubtful and the possession more precarious ana loss
beneficial." The following words from Meyer show that unlike Julius
Caesar, he was not a lover of war merely for its own sake^: "aher
der frische Kampfesmut Casars fehlte ihn ganzlich und wahrend dieser
bei jeder Gelegenheit seine Person rucks ichtlos, ja tollkuhn aufs
Spiel setzte, hie It er sich in alien Gefahren und Kampfen vorsichtig
zuruck." Gardthausen likewise remarks : "Freude am Kriege und an Er-
oberungen ist bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und
doch staatsklugen Caesar billirer Teise vorwerfen konnte."
Inasmuch as Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his
character and inclinations wou^d greatly determine the policy of the
empire. We saw that it was contrary to his character to carry on ex-
tensive wars of conquest, and now we see the workings of the same
principle, that it was also contrary to the general policy of the
Roman state. That peace was the object that Rome had in view is well
known3 . Meyer expresses it well in these . words
4
:
" und diesmal durft
man der Hoffnung sich hingeben, dass dieselbe von Dauer sein werde,
rerade weil die Kampfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einem so furchtbaren
Charakter getragen hatte, weil die Gegner grosstente ils vernichtet,
die Besitzverhaltnisse in we item Umfang von Grund aus umg^.valzt waren
weil aus dem entsetzlichen Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefuhl ubermachtig
sich erhoben hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und
Sicherheit urn jeden Preis 5 ." That t,his is true is also clearly shown
in the Monumentum Ancyranum, quotations from which are riven above .
of the Roman Empire, Boston, 1910, 1, 1, p. 216. (1). Meyer, p. 462.
(5) . Gardthausen, p. 317. (3). Velleius,. 2,89: "Finita vic-
es imo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocatapax, sopitus ubi-
que armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciis auctoritas.
(4). Meyer, p. 455. (5). It is true that this refers
more particularly to the early part of Augustus 1 reign, but we see
the same policy manifested all through his rule and it was continued
by his successors.
(6) . Monumentum Ancyranum, chap. 26: "nulli renti bello per iniur-
1am inlato."
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Gardthausen leaves no doubt on this point when he says 1 : "D r r Friode
war der Preis, urn den Ron sich die Herrschaft des Augustus gefalien
liess: "und auch seine Nachfolger haben in Wesentlichen eine Politik
des Friedens befolrt." The fact that the doors of the temple of
Janus, which had stood open for two hundred and five years , had beei
2
shut three times in the first few years of his reign , shows that he
was very eager to have wars discontinued.
Had it not been contrary to the peace policy of Rome, it
would have been, nevertheless, highly unlike her, to give up a great
national plan of conquest which had once been started, on account of
a single setback. "It was a wound to the pride rather than to the
prosperity of the empire." Rome had suffered only a few defeats of
this sort, but at the beginninr of the -Germanic troubles, Lollius 1
legion, which had been sent against them, was slaughtered and the
eagle captured"^. After the loss of Lollius and his' legion
,
Augustus
apparently thought -it necessary for the honor of the Roman arms to
act on the offensive. To be sure, the defeat of Varus was of more
consequence, but still it was only a "wound, to the pride of Rome."
On the other hand, the overthrow of Lollius came at an earlier date,
at a time when it should have influenced his policy more than Varus'
misfortune, which* occurred long after his plans, as many suppose,
had been definitely formed. Llommsen expresses it well when he says4 :
"The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers
equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the mne might
justify the conclusions of an unfavorable peace; it was the conflict
of a great civilized arid organized state against a brave, but in a
political and military aspect, barbarous nation, in which the
(l). Gardthausen, p. 477. ($) . Hocke, The Roman History, London,
(3) . Velleius, 2,97. 1771, p. 435. Suetonius* Augustus, . 22
:
(4) . Mommsen, p. 54. " Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a
condita urbe ante memoriam s^am clausum, in multo breviore temporis
-fy a, . . " —
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ultinato result was settled from the first, and an isolated failure
in the plan as sketched night as little produce any change as the
ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its
course." So it seems strange that Augustus should have apparently
allowed a defeat, which was of such little consequence from a mil-
itary point of view, to interfere with so great a national policy.
The objections which have beer adduced against the belief
that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany, may be briefly
summarized as follows: 1. He was defeated with a small army in a bat-
tle which was absolutely no test of the military ability of the two
peoples. 2. The defeat was completely avenged by Tiber i\is and Gor-
man icus and Germany was overrun by them only a few years later.
3. The Roman power was infinitely greater than even that of combined
Germany. 4. It was contrary to the well known' character of Augustus
to attempt this war of conquest, and after having begun it, to aban-
don it. 5. It was also contrary to the general peace policy of Rome.
6. It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on account of
a single setback.
^The" consideration of the foregoing objections causes the stu-
dent of history to wonder what really was the effect of Varus 1 de-
feat (on the policy of Augustus], and whether it did play as large a
part in the determination of ^ bis Germanic policy as is generally
supposed. Since this theory, that Augustus was attempting the com-
plete subjugation of Germany, can be advanced only after disregard-
ing these several and weighty objections, cannot an explanation be
found which 7/ill obviate these difficulties and still be consistent
with Augustus 1 acts and policies? Augustus certainly did carry on
war in Germany and overran the rreater part of the country and we
may reasonably ask, what other purpose could he have in mind except
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•JSts subjection. At first thought it might seem as if Augustus wore
aiming at the conquest of Germany, but It' the writer's belief that
Augustus was merely making a series of demonstrations in force, in
order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the
frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome
a wide strip of the enemy's country; and that it was not and never
had been his intention to conquer Germany and organize it as a prov-
ince in the full sense of the word.
^^jt-"' This interpretation agrees with his policies elsewhere and is
not open to the objections cited above. The one objection that can
be offered is that Florus, who is the only ancient authority to men-
tion it, states specifically in the following words that Augustus
desired to subdue Germany : "Germaniam quoque utinam vine ere tanti
non putassetj" And he assigns the following reason for its conquest:
"Set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem bis transvectum ponte
Rhenum quaes isse bellum, in illius honorem concupierat facere pro-
vinciam." It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to
make a province of Germany in honor of his father, Julius Caesar,
for his father "had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power
with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps
and on the right bank of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest
of Britain • If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of
his father, he would have conquered Britain instead, according to
(1) . .Llerivale, History of the Romans under the Empire, Hew York,
1866, IV, p.240:"These repeated advances, however, with the speedy
retreat and proffered submission of the native?, though far from
having the nature of conquests, could not altogether fail in extend-
ing the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central
Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility and of her
conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the
barbarians for the southern civilization which could marshal such ir>-
recist.able forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power! 1
(2) . Florus, 4:12.
(3) . Mommsen, p. 9.

Caesar's expressed wish. Julius Caesar's movements against the Ger-
mans were, as Mommsen 1 agrees, mere forward movements of defense. Is
it not safe then, to assume that Augustus was merely continuing in
a more extensive manner, the policy of his father?
II. CONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT
.
This theory that Augustus was intending to use Germany simply
as a "buffer state, is in keeping with his general frontier policy.
Rome, which held possessions at that time in three different conti-
nents, had on practically every side great natural boundaries, "on
the west the Atlantic Ocean; the Rhine and Danube on the North; the
Euphrates on the east; and towards the south the sandy deserts of
Arabia and Africa^." Lord Curzon shows the necessity of having the
limits of the empire strongly protected, when he says^: "The Roman
Empire finally broke up and perished because it could not
maintain its frontiers intact against the barbarians." It was abso-
lutely necessary for the maintainence of so vast an empire that the
frontiers be naturally strong and capable of being defended by a
relatively small army^. The only points at which an efficient bound-
ary line did not exist were Armenia and Germany. The Elbe was not to
be compared with the Rhine as a defensible frontier. Armenia also,
had no great river or other natural limit. It had: always been the
plan of Augustus to obtain great natural and easily defensible bound-
aries for the empire^, and when these had been secured, to refrain
(1). Mommsen, p. 185. (2). Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, Boston, 1910, p. 217-218. (3). Lord Curzon, Frontiers, Ox-
ford, 1908, p. 8.. (4). It is almost inconceivable that Augustus
could guard so extensive a frontier with only twenty five legions.
(Gardthausen, p. 638.). (f>). Dio Cassius, 56,33 :" y v ^ ^nv re artrSls
^V'Ke TOIS Tfc tto. pouB-LY 4-pK.fc <r&y{ yon. kou |An & <x ^ S s err\ Tf\tlor T-nv "ip^Xy eTTiu tnffO-U
t0£Ah,<r«u' & ut^uAolktoV Tfc V^p iutW ta-fea-Gxv^ K<U K^Aj/tu^tw £k touToj K<U
%ytx iTrc/UVxi efn. To^tc yXp K A auto* #vtuos iet_ UcTt c 6 Aey* y.ovov
' \k\ Kfltl &py(e tTnprvo-t/' mu ycu<r TToAAol £K Too ^pjxp! kou

-13-
fron further conquest.
The importance of a frontier lino is well described by these
worcs of Lord Curzon-*-: "Frontiers are the razor's edge on which hang
suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life or death to
nations." In selecting a frontier, it is always best to obtain a
great natural frontier, as a great river, but in order to make this
boundary the strongest possible, it is desirable to provide in add it-
ion, a series of buffer states. When a line of buffer states have
been secured, the enemy can either be met on this ground, or their
attack can be checked by these friendly tribes. In this way, the
brunt of the war is borne by others and there is far less likelihood
of a successful invasion. A semi-dependent state of this sort preclud-
es ajl possibility of frequent inroads and quick withdrawal, as the
enemy are so far away that these are impossibilities. That Rome laid
great dependence on the vassal state is shown by the following words
of Lord Cur zon^ :".... \and to^the practice of the Roman Empire, which
sought to protect its Frontiers by a fringe of dependent kingdoms or
client-states .°"
The advantage of buffer states is clearly shown in the case of
Gaul. We learn from these words of Velleius that Gaul was the richest
4 it
of the Roman provinces : Divus Augustus .... paene idem facta Aegyp-
tc stipendiaria, quantum pater eius Galliis, in aerarium reditus
(1). Lord Curzon, p. 7. (2). Lord Curzon, p. 32.
(3). Lord Curzon in this article states that" in the Western Empire
(p. 38), protectorate states were not required against the barbarians,
who were formidable, not from their organization, but from their num-
bers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in
Britain, Gaul^ Germany or Africa, required to be. employed." He is
probably speaking of a later period than that of Augustus when purely
military barriers were provided, especially along the Danube. The sit-
uation in Germany proper, in the time of Augustus, required a military
defense in addition to the buffer states. Co we cannot take Lord
Curzon' s opinion here as referring particularly to the time of Augus-
tus and to this particular boundary. His statement is in its. general
proposals true, and he probably had not carefully investigated this
one isolated case. (4). Velleius, 2,39.
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contulit. 11 It was necessary for the very existence of Rone that Gaul
be under her sway. Ferrero says^-: "Gaul alone, revived, so to speak,
i the Empire in the 7fest and prevented the European provinces - even
Italy itself - from becoming dead limbs, safely anputable from the
Oriental body. Gaul upheld Italy and Rome in Europe for three centur-
ies longer." Augustus recognized this fact^ and saw the necessity of
a strong barrier to protect Gaul and allow the people to turn their
attention to their trades. Heretofore, Gaul had been able to check
the Germanic invasions because there wan no "unifying or guiding in-
telligence connecting these disorganized forcer ," but "now Gaul had
lost her military energy, while the poor and barbarous Germans cast
a. 5
covetous glances upon her wealth". " Gaul was," as Ferrero says
,
"now open to the Germans, who could have made their way through these
pacific populations and have marched upon Italy without encountering
any obstacle upon their road except five legions." For these reasons,
Augustus was forced to take the defense of Gaul upon himself. The
sudden invasions and speedy departures of the Germans must be stopped
because "as long as it (Gaul) was split into so many petty states,
occupied in serious wars against the Germanic tribes, its fertility
remained hidden in the earth, and the ability of its inhabitants
dissipated itself in devastating wars, instead of spending itself in
j
fruitful effort^." Therefore, Augustus either had to provide an army
large enough to defend the Rhine all along its course, or secure a
series of buffer states which would be ever, more effective. The for-
mer was impossible, so he, of necessity, resolved on the latter. It
was only in this way that he could save Gaul for Rome.
1 (l). Ferrero, Characters and Events of Roman History, The Develop-
ment of Gaul. Translated by F.L. Ferrero, Uew York, 1909. p. 95.
(2). Id. p« 93. (3). Ferrero^ p. 130.
(4). Fcrrerof p. 131. (5). 11 r^.129.
(G). Ferrero, Characters and Events, p. 97.
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Although Gaul was one of the richest province??, Germany was
poor and not worth the trouble and expense of conquest-'- . The Germans
were an uncivilized, barbarous, nomadic people, wandering about from
place to ^lace and having no town:, or villages of importance. They
manufactured few articles, lived on the soil, raising merely enough
to subsist from year to year, and war was their sole occupation.
Ferrero says with good reason^ that Augustus attempted to conquer
Germany, not because of its wealth, but because he recognized that
it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul.
Not only was Germany a very poor country, but even after it
had been acquired, it would be a difficult task to hold it in sub-
jection. As has been stated above, the Elbe, on account of its size
and the character of the surrounding country, was not nearly as ef-
fective a boundary as the Rhine. For these reasons alone, the dif-
ficulty of maintaining it as a frontier was much greater^, and in ad-
dition it was farther from Rome and could be reached only by pass-
ing through almost trackless forests and swamps . More soldiers
would be needed to guard -it and an army would be necessary on the
Rhine at the same time# This would require an additional number of
troops. Augustus could not help but realize this and he also knew
that it was inadvisable to leave enough troops in Germany, sufficient
to man both boundaries. The people there were of such a nature that
repeated conquest would be necessary to keep them under control, a
fact which is shown by the course of the Germanic wars.
These encounters with the Germans had begun as early as the
time of Julius Caesar, and Agrippa had had to expel from Gaul in
20 B.C. Germanic hordes from across the Rbine . In 1C B.C., Ilommsen
(1). Ferrero;' p. 143. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
Boston, 1910, 1,1, p. 217. (2). Ferrero, p. 143.
(3) . Tscitus* Germania, 2. (5). Mommsen, p. 28, 29. Dio, 48, 49.
(4) . Mommsen, p.G2; "But it was another question, whether after the
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tells us , ' they attacked tho Roman traders sojeurning among then
and nailed thorn to the cross, then crossed the Rhine, pillaged the
da1lie cantons far and wide, and when the governor of Gaul sent the
legate, Marcus Lollius, with the fifth legion against then, they
first cut off its cavalry and then put the legion itself to disgrace-
ful flight, on which occasion even its eagle fell into their hands.
After all this, they returned unas sailed to their hones and
this nay possibly have been the immediate occasion for the o.dopticn
of that great movenent of offense, which, beginning with the Raetian
war in 15 11. C. led on to the campaigns of Tiberius in Illyricun and
of Drusus in Germany." Thus we see' the Germanic wars begun as a movc-
p
ment of- defense, to protect the Gauls. A few lines lower Mommsen
speaks of the retaliatory expedition against the tribes of the nid-
die Rhine and he distinctly says : "It was the Germans who assumed
the offens ive .
"
Since we see the wars begun as a matter of defense, we might
ask whether they were subsequently carried on as defensive or offen-
sive operations. We know little of the expedition of Agrippa across
the Rhine in 38 B.C., except that he was the first to cross since Ju-
4 5lius Caesar
,
and probably as Gardthausen suggests : "Dauerende Erob-
erungen zu machen, war natiirlich nicht seine Absicht gewesen; or woll-
te den deutschen Stannen nur zeigen, dass Rom durch die inneren Kriege
institution of the Elbe frontier, the troops could be withdrawn fron
the intervening region." p. 63: "The Roman public was wont indeed to
boast that the state held all Gaul in subjection by means of the gar-
rison at Lyons, 1200 strong; but the governnent could not forget that
the two great armies on the Rhine not merely warded off the Germans,
but also had a very material fcear&ng on the Gallic cantons, that were
not at all distinguished by subuiss iveness . Stationed on the Weser cr
even on the Elbe, they world not have rendered this service in equal
measure, and to keep both the Rhine and the Elbe occupied was beyond
their power."
(l). Mommsen, p. 29. (2). Mommsen, p. 30.
(3) . Mommsen, p. 31.
(4) . Dio, 48,49.
(5) . Gardthausen, p. 255.
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nicht mehr so sehr in Auspruch genommen sei, class es nicht aucb die
Verh&ltnir.se ain Rhein im Auge behalten kcmne." '-'he work of Drusus
can be traced more definitely. In 12 B.C. the Sugambri and their al-
lies seized all the Romans whom they could lay hold of on their hank,
and nailed to the cross the centurions among them, twenty in number
.
These tribes attempted to cross over into Gaul in the beginning of
the year 12 B.C., but Drusus drove them back as they were crossing
the stream and then crossed the river himself in order to lay waste
their country. Continuing the attack against them, a fleet sailed
along the northern coast as far as the mouth of the Weser, and after
several victories, the Romans cane back home safely, but with con-
siderable difficulty. In the following year, 11 B.C., Drusus led his
army inland and was victorious in Germany between the Rhine and the
Weser, but on his return the troops barely escaped being ambuscaded 2
,
and it was only due to the skill of their general that the Romans
came away victorious. In 10 B.C., the Chatti revolted and were sub-
dued, and in the following year, Drusus, pillaging the entire dist-
il 3net as he went, advanced, to the Elbe but did not cross it. It was
during the return of this expedition that Drusus died4 . In all of
these campaigns, Drusus spent the summer in the field and during the
winter months withdrew with all of his legions to the Rhine 5
,
and it
was not until his last expedition in 9 B.C. that he built a fortress
m Germany, brt then, no troops were left to garrison it . The guard-
(1). Florus, 4,12. j Homos ex* p. 31. (2). Ifoxmnaen, n.32; Dio,54:32,3,
(3). Die, 55:1. (4). Strabo, VII, 1,3. p. 291.
(5) . In speaking cf the expedition of Tiberius in 4 A.D., Ve.lleius
says, 2:105: "in cuius (Germaniae) mediis finibus ad caput Lupiae
flumii.is hiberna digrediens princeps locaverat."
(6) . Dio, 54:33.
(7) . No garrisons were left in the country which wo- Id be of any
great advantage, as Julius Caesar had done in Gaul, where T^e would
place a legion or more at each fort. These fortifications that Florus
speaks of were probably merely temporary stopping places for the army
on its march through the country and for keeping communications with
the Rhine. This view is upheld by the fact that Velie ins does not
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ing of these districts by means of Rno.ll detachments scattered in
vnrious forts throughout the country would have been the only suc-
cessful method of keeping the many tribes under complete control.
These annual incursions into their country served merely as a means
of keeping their warriors from attacking Gaul and at the same time
impressed upon them the superiority of Roman arms.
After the death of Drusus, Tiberius took command in Germany
and remained there during the following two years, 8 and 7 B.C. « No
great battles were fought during this time, but Tiberius carried on
2the policy of Drusus, as Velleius tells us : "Moles deinde eius belli
trans lata in Neronem est: quod is sua et virtute et fortuna adminis-
travit peragratusque victor omnis partis Germaniae sine ullo detri-
mentp commissi ex^rcitus, quod praecipue huic duci semper curae fuit,
sic perdomuit earn, ut in forraam paene stipendariae redigeret provin-
ciae." Practically all the tribes were compelled to acknowledge Rom-
an rule, and in the year 6 B.C., Domitius Ahenobarbus was placed in
charge. He was able to reach and cross the Elbe without meeting any
4
effective resistance". But still, even after such successes, there
was, as Momms en admits
,
no attempt to move the frontier guard away
from the Rhine. Although not a province, as Velleius soys above, yet
the Romans did not endeavor to secure their acquisitions by means of
garrisons scattered here and there, as Caesar had done in Gaul, and
which was} the only possible way of keeping it under their control6
.
If the Elbe was to be maintained as the boundary of the empire, why
was it not protected by a line of forts as the Rhine had been,
W&Jition these posts and it is very unlikely that he would have fail-
ed to mention them if they had been of any consequence, as he was
there in person.
(1). Velleius, 2:97. (2). Velleius, 2:97.
(3). Mommsen, p. 34. (4). Dio, 55:10.
(5) . Mommsen, p. 35.
(6) . See p. 17, 'note 7.

instead of by a single one at most ? Indeed the Elbe for various
reasons was in far greater need of well garrisoned fortifications
than the Rhine,
In 1 B.C. Domitius left Germany and went to the Orient with
pCaesar and his place was taken by M.Vinicius
. Little is known of
his wars except that he was successful and won triumphal insignia
for himself a second tine
. In 4 A .D . Tiberius after returning from
"'odes again assumed chief command in Germany and in the three foll-
owing yaar-e, 4,5 and 6 a.D., expeditions were led across the Rhine,
j
The whole of the country was traversed and during the winter after
the campaign of the year 4 a.D., the Roman armv took up its winter
quarters for the first time in Germany4
. Even then, the camp was
placed at Aliso, which was not more than one fifth of the way across
Germany. to the Elbe. A fleet again navigated the North Sea and sail-
ed up the Elbe to meet Tiberius. This was all accomplished with no
loss to his army° and he again led them back to winter quarters
,
as Augustus had forbidden the crossing of the Elbe?
In the following year Tiberius and Saturnius started on their
great campaign against Llaroboduus, since, as Velleius says with
pardonable exaggeration, nothing else remained to be conquered in
Germany
.
But that Germany was not a province at this time is shown
by Dio's words : "iirel &' 6 Co£pOS Kuev-n-'Atos .... t'* re £\u J>s
KOLl ScuAtUOVcrl GQl CTLY £ 7T£T<>tTTfc KCLL p-(X.T<JL d> s KOI TTQLp' UTTUKOWV
kiraTTp^'r^y" Tne sudden uprising in P: nnonia frustrated the plans of
(1) . Elorus, 4:12. "Praeterea in tutelam provinciae praesidia atque
custodias ubique deposuit per I.Iosam f lumen, per Albim, per Visurgim.
In Rheni qi idem ripa ouinquaginta amplius castella direxit."
(2) . Gardthausen, p. 1160. (o)~. Velleius, 2:104.
(4) . Velleius, 2:105, also 2:106, " Pc-rlustrata armis tota Germsnia
est, victae gentes naene nominibns inco^-nitae .
"
(5) . £ (0). yelleius, 2:107.
(7) . Strabo, VII, p. 291.
(C). Velleius, 2:108, 109.
(9). Die, 56:18.

Tiberius and Saturnius when seemingly on the verge of accomplishment
and compelled the Romans to direct their attention thither • The re-
volt/iras ©verthrown after three years of fighting, and during J ' is
interval, Varus was placed in command in Germany. It is certainly
surprising to note that after Tiberius had conquered, as Velleius
expresses it, all of Germany except the Marcommani
,
no r;arrisons
were left in the different parts of the country
,
and we find Varus
making the same sort of summer expeditions that his predecessors had
4
made • It was on one of these summer tours that he met with his de-
feat. Little was accomplished by Varus before his disaster except
that by means of these excursions through the country, the natives
were held in check.
It is generally presumed that Varus was sent into the count-
ry to carry out the final steps for the establishment of a province
in Germany . The support of this view lies in the fact that it is
commonly understood that he attempted to establish a system of
courts throughout Germany and that taxes were levied as upon a sub-
ject nation. For these reasons, the discussion of these transactions
of Augustus are of great importance. If it is proven that Varus was-
endeavoring to set up a comprehensive system at the command of Aug-
ustus, then there can be little doubt but that it was his intention
to provincialize Germany. A careful survey of the historians' state-
ments in this respect will be necessary to ascertain the real status
of the situation
.
7Velleius tells us : "is cum exercitui, qui erat in German ia,
praeesset, concepit esse homines, qui nihil praeter vocen membraque
haberent hominum, quique gladlis domari non poterant, posse iure
mulceri. Quo proposito, median processus Gcrnaniam velut inter
CD. Velleius, 2:110. (a). Zee p. 19, note 8. (4). Velleius , 2 : 117.
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viros pacis gaudentes dulcedinc iuriadictionibus agendoque pro trib-
unali ordir.e trahebat aectiva." From this we learn that Varus himself
spent the summer in dec id inn; their controversies. It would only be
natural for two German tribes, families or individuals, who might be
at variance with one another, to appeal to the general °f & foreign,
friendly country, who had no personal interests at stake, just as
they might under other circumstances appeal to a rovernor. Then it
would be nothing remarkable at all, when we remember that, as Llomnsen
says^", "and in f~rateful humility, the conspirators especially receiv-
ed judgement and justice at his hands while the net was being drawn
rsore and more closely around the arrogant praetor." If they had some
purpose in thus leading on this man who was very willing to take up
.this form of work rather thar an arduus military campaign, it is not
surprising that these courts of justice flourished.
Not only would the Germans thus come to him for decisions, but
in case a Roman trader or inhabitant should have a case for settle-
ment, he well knew that if it cor Id be brought before a Roman judge,
he would get justice at least, and in most cases would probably get
more than his due. So in either case, the Roman general would be ask-
ed to render a decision. "Tie do not see him trying to establish a jud-
icial circuit throughout the country, but only in connection with his
camp wherever it might happen to be. Florus ' words are in support of
this view when he says : "postquam ille ^defunctus est, Vari Quintilli
libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.
(Continued from preceding page) was of no conquence in holding Ger-
many. (4). Velleius, 2:117.
(5) . Oardthausen, p. 1197.
(6) . The ancient authorities in this connection are: Velleius, 2:117
Florus, 4:12; and Dio, 5G:18.-
(7) . Velleius, 2:117.
(1) . Llommsen, p. 49.
(2) . Florus, 4:12.

Ausus illo agore conventun, cttincauto scdiacerat,t quasi violentiani
barbarum lictoris virgis et praeconis voce posset inhibcrc." From
this we sec that Varus was not really placing courts broadcast over
Germany and hence it cannot bo assumed that Augi stus already consid-
ered Germany as a province and was desirous of strengthening his or-
ganization by means of this judiciary.
The other important phase of Varus 1 work is concerning the
tribute that he received from the Germans. In Dio we read the foll-
owing 1
: " K*l A T£ &AA<* d>s K«\ iovU'oovrl ^ccr.y &w£tx.TT£ K(t\
X/>nV*T* ^ K*l Wa.p' ^TrnK^y i (t/tt pa crcr £Yj OuK W«rX ,vTo. " At f irst
glance it would seem that this ought to convince us that Varus was
really organizing a province of Germany. If we note it carefully,
however, we sec that he says: "he treated them in general as if they
were already slaves, levying money upon them as he had upon subject
nations. (Poster) 11 This means that it was not considered as a prov-
ince or as a subject nation. It implies that other conquests would
have to be made by military strength before it could be taxed. This
goes to prove that Varus was acting above his authority, for a count-
ry which was not. already a province, could not be transformed into
such, merely by the assessment of taxes. Or, on the other hand
J
it
may be similar to the tribute taken from the Frisians by Drusus in
11 B.C. Tacitus tells of it in these words : "Eodcm anno, Frisii,
transrhenanus populus, pacem exuere, nostra magis avaritia quam
obsequ ii impatientes. Tribvtum iis Drusus jusserat modicum, pro an"
gustia rerum, ut in usus militares coria bourn penderent .* It may have
been something of this sort, but at any rate, it was not of such a
nature as would cause us to believe that Augustus was intending to
(1) . Dio, 56:18.
(2) . Tacitus 1 Annals, 4:72.

subdue Germany.
As the Pannonian war had beer ended shortly before the news
of the misfortune of Varus, Tiberius was free to go to Germany and
assume command. He was, as Velleius tells us in the following words,
very successful against them-*-: "Llittitur ad Gemaniam, Gallias con-
firmat, disponit exercitus, praesidia munit et se magnitudine sua,
non fiducia h.ostis met ions, qui Cimbricam Teutonicamque militiam
Italiae minabatur, ultro Rhenura cum exercitu transgreditur. Arm
infert, quae arcuisse pater et patria contenti erant
;
pcnetrat in-
terius, aperit limites, vastat agros, urit domes, fund it obvios
maximaque cum gloria, incolumi ' omnium, quos transduxerat , numero in
hiberna revertitur. Dio says'5 that Tiberius crossed the Rhine in
11 A.D. and with no opposition overran parts of Germany, but did not
advance far from the Rhine. Velleius adds, however "Quia enim dub-
itare potest et post cladem sub Varo acceptam, expecta.to ocius
prosperrimo rcrum eventu eadem excisa Germania triumphus sumni due is
adornari debuerit?" This proves that his accomplishments in these
years were by no means slight, Gardthausen also recognizes that his
service in these years was certainly not trifling, when he says4 :
"Tiberius konnte nach Rom heimkehren in dem stolzen Geflihl, dass
durch sein Verdienst die schlimmste Kris is des Kaiserreichs glucklicb
uberwunden sei. Man mag uber den spc teren Kaiser urtheilen, wie man
will, jedenfalls muss man zugeben, dass es kaum einen der spateren
Taiscr gegeben hat, der sich vor seiner Thronbesteigung so grosse
und langjahrige Verdienste um den ro'mischen Staat erworben hatte,
Verdienste, die auch sein Todfeind, Tacitus, anerkennen muss,"
(1) . Velleius, 2:120.
(2) . Dio, 56:25.
(3) . Velleius, 2:122.
(4) . Gardthausen, p. 1227. ^t^tf^
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In the year 13 a.D. Germanicus took command in Gorraany, but little
''ore was accomplished until the year 14 a.D. In the fall of this
year he crossed over the Rhino, penetrated up the valley of the
Lippe and laid waste the country far and wide . In the year 15 a.D.
he arrived at the scene of the Varus massacre, after having ravaged
the country between the Ems and the Lippe, and collected and buried
the bones of those who had fallen under Varus. ^ On their return they
encountered some difficulties, and it was only by good generalship
•7.
on the part of Germanicus that a catastrophe was averted
. Germani-
cus planned his campaign for the following year by securing a fleet
and, sailing in this to the mouth of the Ems, he avoidod marching his
army through the Teutoburg Forests^. Two battles were fought and the
Romans were victorius in each. Germanicus reported to Rome, as Llomm-
sen says, that he would have the subjugation of Germany complete in
the next campaign^.
In all of these expeditions against the Germans, several
characteristics are noticed in each which are strikingly similar to
the others. This is true to a remarkable extent in the wars of «.g-
rippa, Drusus, Tiberius, Domitius /ihenobarbus, Vinicius, Varus and
Germanicus. In each of these marches against the Germans, there
would be merely the wearing down of any opposition wherever it show-
ed itself, .nil of the above mentioned leaders would take their troops
into Germany during the summer months and at the approach of winter
would bring them back to winter quarters, on or very near the Rhine
.
If it had been their intention to organize Germany as a province, it
would have been an effective way of keeping it under control, for the
Romans to establish winter quarters in their very midst, where the
(1) . Tacitus' Annals, 1:56.
(2) . Tacitus 1 Annals, 1:62; Dio, 57:18. (o ) . Tacitus' Annals, 1:63.
(4) . Tacitus' Anhals, 2:5. (6). Zee p. 20, note, 3.
(5) . Tacitus* Annals, 2:26, "Pre canto Germanico annum efficiendis

presence of armed forces would tend to discourage any movement on the
part of the Germans. We fine' no attempts, even after all of Germany
had been overrun, to post garrisons in the country which would have
been sufficient to keep it under subjection . There was also no at-
p
tempt to move the frontier line from the Rhine ) and if we accept
Florus 1 statement concerning the posts in Germany, more than fifty
were built along the Rhine . It had always been the plan of Julii:s
Caesar to secure immediately a conquered district by placing a guard
there, large enough to overthrow any uprising of the vanquished peo-
ple. We can only infer that by neglecting to do this most necessary
thing, Augustus clearly shows that he did not have in view the or-
ganization of Germany as a province.
Another fact, interesting to note, is that whenever a tribe
could be made friendly to Rome, they were not conquered and were at
the same time practically exempt from tribute or war service. The
Batavi and the Frisians are the first examples of this policy. They
became friendly to Rome, as Llommsen tells us^, and were compelled to
furnisli little or no tribute and few soldiers. In like manner in 10
B.C. Drusus attempted to establish friendly relations with Rome am-
ong the Chatti, by. giving them the old territory of the Ubii. Althoug
5he did not accomplish his object, his purpose is evident
. Then from
Tacitus, we reader "Se (Tiber ium) novies a divo Angus to in Germaniam
mis sum, plura consilio quam vi perfecisse: sic Sugambros in ded it ion-
em acceptas: sic Suevoc, regemque Llaroboduum pace obstr ictum. " In
coeptis" may mean as Mommsen construes it, that Germanicus reported
to Rome that he would have the conquest of Germany complete in the
next campaign.
(1) . See p. 17, note 7, and p. 19, note 1.
(2) . Mommsen, p. 35. (3). Florus, 4:12.
(4 ) . Mommsen, p. 31.
(5) . Gardthausen, p.lC85.
(6) . Tacitus' Annals, 2:26.
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this way his purpose war> acc or.pl ished without forr.al conquest. If the
tribes were friendly, Augustus had attained his end, for they, even
bettor than conquered tribes, would hold back any encnvy that night
start an invasion.
Another noteworthy consideration is that Augustus had given
orders not to cross the Elbe 1 . Had he intended to extend his empire
to the Elbe, he would have been compelled to make demonstrations ac-
ross it, just as he had across the Rhine and across the Danube2 . We
learn that Augustus had decided that it was necessary for both banks
of the Rhine to be held3 in order to secure it as a boundary, and it
was certainly even more necessary, on account of the smaller size of
the river, for the Elbe to be manned on either side.
The peculiar characteristics that we have noted concerning the
wars of Augustus, in brief, are: 1. The wars consisted merely in the
annual wearing down of opposition and were not formal conquest.
2. Winter quarters were never established in Germany until 5 A.D.
and then only at Alisc. 3. No garrisons were left anywhere at anytime,
4. Llany forts were built on the Rhine, while only one, if any, on the
Elbe, and it was abandoned immediately. 5. If the tribes coi-ld be
made friendly, they were not conquered. 6. Augustus had given orders
not to cross the Elbe. :
The theory that has been advanced, regarding Augustus 1 attitude
in Germany would not seem so plausible, did it not have analogies in
other parts of the empire. The closest comparison is in the case of
Armenia. There is no doubt but that Armenia was a buffer "state, at
one time serving the purposes of Rome and again being used by Parth-
ia to the same end . Lord Curzon expresses it admirably, when in
(1) . Strabo, VII, p. 291.
(2) . Ilonumentum Ancyranum, c.oC: "et portea trans Danuvium ductus
exercitus meus Dacorum gentes imperia po?mli Romani, rerferre coegit"
(o). II. S.Jones, Roman Empire, How York, 1908. p. 46.
(••-).
~
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speaking of protectorates, ho says 1 : "The Roman Empire is tho class-
ical illustration of this policy, though in a s onewhat inchoate form
in the ancient world But in the East, where the ambitions of
Rome for the first time encountered a rival and civilized Power of
almost equal strength with itself, namely, the Parthian or Persian
Kingdom, the perils of actual contact were for long delayed by a
barrier of protected states, the majority under the political suzer-
ainty of Rome, some of them oscillating from one allegiance to ano-
ther, according to the degree of pressure applied; the most import-
ant of all, by reason of its physical features and geographical pos-
ition, namely, Armenia, having a career which in its stormy vicissi-
tudes has recalled to many writers the chequered and fateful exper-
ience, between the rival Powers cf Great Britain and Russia of the
buffer kingdom of Afghanistan." Mommsen expresses the same- belief
when he says^: "The frontier (in Asia Minor) was in the first period
of the empire formed throughout by the dependent principalities." We
3
see the working of this same principle of forming vassal states in
34 B.C., when Antony parceled out Armenia along with some other king
doms of the East, to various rulers . Again in 26 B.C. Augustus put
a king on the throne in Armenia, named Tigranes, who had been educat
ed in Rome. This is referred to in the Ilonumentum Ancyranum as foll-
ows . "Armeniam maiorem interfecto rege cuius Artaxe cum possem
facore provinciam, malui, maiorum nostrorum exemplo, regnum id Tig-
rani regis Artavasdie filio, nopoti autem Tigranis regis, per Ti.
Tleronem traderc, qui turn mihi provignus erat."
(l). Lord Curzon, p. 38, (2). I.!ommsen, p. 351.
(3) . That Gardthausen also considered Armenia a vassal state is
shown by those words of his (p. 335): "als Ilerrscher von Rom einen
kleinen Vasallenstaat zwciten oder dritten Ranges treulos entwaffnet
und niedergewcrfen zu haben."
(4) . Dio, 40:40,41.
( 5 ) . Monumentui i Ancyranum, c . 27
.

Armenia, as wo observe above from Mommr.cn, war not the only
"buffer state in the East, Media was used in the same way. for they
asked for and were given a king by Augustus, as is learned from these
words of his 1 : "A me pontes Parthorum et Lledorum per legates prin-
cipes earum gentium reges petitos acceperunt .... iledi Ar iobarzanem
regis Artavasdis f ilium regis Ariobarzanis nepotem." The geographi-
cal position of Armenia and Media rendered it imperative that they
be vassal states, but wherever it was necessary, in Arabia, Armenia,
Media or elsewhere, Augustus secured his boundary by means of these
buffer states. If he used this method so extensively in one part of
the empire, is it not consistent to infer that the same method was
used where similar circumstances prevailed? In the north against the
barbarians, a buffer state would seem to be more servicable than in
the east, where it was used against a highly civilized and powerful
nation. The barbarians were accustomed to make short, sudden inroads
and before the attacked could assemble an army, the3^ would return to
their homes. For this reason, a vassal state, which v/ould keep them
at a distance and render these invasions impossible, would be of in-
valuable service. Can we not therefore reasonably assert that Augus-
tus did not intend to add Germany to his realm as a province, but
merely wanted it to serve for the protection of Gaul and Rome?
The success of his policy is clearly shown by the subsequent
history of the Germanic boundaries. The Rhine remained as the fron-
tier of the Empire for almost four centuries^, and it probably
would not have been broken then, had not the Danube line given way
to the on- rushing barbarians. Their movements were almost all direct-
ed across the Danube border, while only one tribe forced, its way
( 1 ) . Monument an A> ;c yranum, ed . Y?J , p . 143
.
(2) . Ludwig Schmidt, Die Ursachen der Volkerwanderung, Neue
Jahrbiichcr f 1G05 . I
.
p .542. |

across the Rhino 1 . Schmidt telle us of these wanderings in these
words: "Die Richtung dor Vo'lkerzuge war naturgemasz in der Hauptsache
eine sudliche und siidostliche: nur die Burgunden haben sich nach
Westen gewendet und durch ihr vorwartsdrangen auch cine Toil dor West
gcrmanen in Bewcgung gesetzt." Thus we soe the successor this policy
of frontier defense which enabled the Roman Empire to preserve this
boundary intact for almost four centuries.
The conclusion, then, which can be drawn from the foregoing
argument, is, that it was not the intention of Augustus to subdue
Germany for the following reasons: 1. It was opposed to his general
policy of government. 2. The method of carrying on his warfare in
Germany was different from that used in other countries which were
really conquered, but similar to his manner of handling buffer states
3. Varus' defeat was not a heavy blow and Germany could have been
overcome just as easily after this misfortune as before it had occur-
red. 4. There is no direct evidence to show that this was his aim .
Therefore, if the preceding conclusion is accepted as true,
then the defeat ' of Varus was not of such world wide significance as
some claim for it, but was merely an incidental overthrow of a few
Roman soldiers, which exerted no appreciable influence upon the plans
of Augustus with reference to the northern frontier.
(1). Schmidt, p. 342. (2). Schmidt, p. 347.
(3). Augustus does say in the Llonumentum Ancyranum (c.26): "Gallias
et Hispanias provine las et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus
ad ostium A lb is flumen pacavi." He does net say: "imperio pcruli
Romani subicci," as he does in other places when speaking of count-
ries that were actually conquered and organized as provinces . (c .30
)
Then too, the will that Augustus left, in which he advised his
successors not to enlarge the Empire, probably was written quite a
while previous to his death, as Hommsen says in the following words:
(Der Rechenschaftsber icht des Augustus, p. 13.) "1st es aber so sicher
dasz die varianische Katastrophc bereits cingetreten war, als Augus-
tus diese Worte cchrieb? Nach sprachlichen Indicien ist das Schrift-
stuck von Augustus nicht erst wenige M©nate vor soinem Tode, sonderm
fruher aufgesetzt und durch Uberarbeitung von fremder Hand auf das
Datum ungeschrieben worden, welches es tragt." So this argument, if
not for, certainly is not against our theory.

ArPSITDIX.
Florus 1 Rating as a Historian.
morns' rating as a historian is very low indeed. Eussner^
expresses it concisely when he cays: "so wird ran Florus uberhaupt
nicht als Kistoriker gelten las sen." 7/achsmuth well compares Florus
and Velleius in these words 2 : " T.7enn wir nithin bei Velleius wirklich
die aufrichtige Theilnahne eines Freundcs dcr Geschichte finden, so
ist bei dem Zweiten in der Reihe, bei Florus, sachliche Intcresse
-ens geschwunden und nur ein rhetorisch-stilist isches iibrig goblieb^
en und danit sein TCerth als Geschichtsquelle auf Null reducirt."
He also points out Florus' motive in writing his works : "Den rhet-
orischen Dichtcr oder auch dem Verse machenden Rhetor kommt es je-
doch durchaus nicht darauf an, die Thatsachen zu erzahlcn, soneern
das Charakt'eristische und Si^enthumliche der einzelncn Geschehr.isse
noglichst drastisch und eindruckvoll zu schildern mit der ausge-
sprochenen Tendenz, die Gr5sr,e und Herrlichke it der romischen Kriegs
geschichte den Lesern vor Augen zu stellen. Dass er infolge dest.en
noglichst aller 'zum grb'sseren Ruhme des romisches Vclkes ' wencct,
ist noch das geringere Uebel. Vicl schlinmer ist es, dass er in der
Sucht, imner etwas Geistreiches, Fikantes, Ueberraschendes zu sagen,
das Thatsachliche so verwischt, dass seine flitzernde Darstellung
fur den Geschichtsforscher fast werthlos wird."
The above shows how much credence can be placed in the facts
that Florus gives. This would cause any one to doubt any statement
made by Florus, which is either contradicted or omitted by another
or all writers. Then, just from the statements above, there is
(1) . Eussner, Philologus , no. 57, 1877, p. 133.
(2) . Wachsmuth, Einleitung in die alte Geschichte, Leipzig, 1895,
p. 610. (3). id. p. 611.

reasonable ground for doubting; the historical accuracy of hie state-
ment v/hen he says: "Gernaniara quoque utinam vincore tanti non put-
arrctj " In the sane quotation, Vfachsmuth, in speaking of Florus as
a rhetorician, tells of him in these words: "Gewiss ist or ein ranz
anders geubter Stilist als Velleius; die Routine hat aber zur Llanier
gofiihrt; gewisse Lieblingsbilder hetzt er zu Tode. so das Gleichniss
vom Feuer, das bald heimlich glimmt, bald als Kriegsflaiame angeschurt
wird, bald zun 77eltbrando emporlodertj ewig verliert cr sich in staun
ende Ausrufe. Und die nach taciteischen I.Iuster gebildete, fast dieter-
isch nalende Sprache ist zwar reich an originellen TCendungen und Tr op-
en aber arg schwiilstig unci affektirt und nicht frei von Geschnack-
Ics igkeiton. " The following quotation from Eussner, Philologus, says
practically the same as is expressed above: "Immer wieder begegnen
die nenlichen Vergleiche, Metaphern, Ausrufe und Wirkcn ermiidend wie
die stete Wiederkehr der Steigerung, welche das ganze Buch unseres
Autors durchdringt.
"
These statements would convince us that Florus' belief concer-
ning the Germanic wars, as cited above, was merely a rhetorical "Aus-
ruf " , that it was an opinion of his own, and was inserted merely for
the sake of making the reading as artistic as possible. Therefore, as
^achsmuth says above, his worth as a source of history is reduced to
naught, and there is no logical reason, unless it can be maintained
by some other argument, for believing that Augustus was contemplating
the subjection of Germany.
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